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BEYOND WINTER V. NRDC: A DECADE OF 
LITIGATING THE NAVY’S ACTIVE SONAR 
AROUND THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXEMPTIONS 
Robin Kundis Craig*
Abstract: To find ultra-quiet modern submarines, the Navy uses high-
powered active sonar. However, active sonar is also linked to marine 
mammal strandings and other types of harms to whales, dolphins, fish, 
and sea turtles. This connection has led to over a decade of challenges 
against the Navy’s active sonar training exercises in the Pacific, culminat-
ing in the U.S. Supreme Court’s November 2008 decision in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council. This Article suggests that the Supreme 
Court’s failure to reach the merits of the case—the actual legality of the 
Navy’s training exercises off the southern California coast—is the most 
troubling part of the Court’s somewhat cabined analysis of the lower 
courts’ preliminary injunctions. Specifically, this Article argues that the 
Navy sonar litigation represents a progressive elimination both of flexibil-
ity in the applicable environmental requirements and effective oversight 
of military actions that could ensure that neither national security nor 
environmental goals are unnecessarily sacrificed. 
Introduction 
 In the murky world of the oceans’ depths, sound becomes an im-
portant means of enhancing survival, both for sea creatures such as 
whales and, according to the U.S. Navy, for Americans. Since the mid-
1990s, the Navy has been working to employ lower-frequency sonar 
(“Sound Navigation and Ranging”) on its patrol ships to allow better 
detection of increasingly quiet submarines. Specifically, the Navy has 
been testing three types of active sonar systems that emit pulses of 
sound into the water and then detect the echoes as that sound pulse 
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bounces off objects.1 Mid-Frequency Active Sonar (MFAS), which the 
Navy has been using since World War II, employs frequencies of one to 
ten kilohertz (kHz) and typically can detect objects one to ten nautical 
miles away.2 Low-Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) uses sound frequen-
cies of less than 1 kHz, which suffer less attenuation in seawater and 
hence allow the Navy to detect objects up to 100 nautical miles away.3 
The Navy uses its Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) 
LFAS system for long-range search and surveillance of submarines,4 
and it would like to employ that system in at least 75% of the world’s 
oceans. 
 The problem, however, is that these active sonar systems are loud. 
MFAS systems can emit continuous sound of more than 235 decibels 
(dB)—a noise level comparable to a rocket blastoff, according to the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).5 While the Navy disputes 
that comparison, its own studies indicate that the sound pulse can still 
be 140 dB as far as 300 miles away from the source.6 Such sonar pulses 
are strongly correlated with adverse effects on marine organisms, in-
cluding mass whale and dolphin strandings and physical trauma to and 
deaths of whales, dolphins, seals, sea lions, sea turtles, and even fish. 
 Using a variety of statutes and raising both substantive and proce-
dural challenges to the Navy’s activities, environmental organizations 
and others have been seeking to stop or modify the Navy’s uses of 
MFAS and LFAS for over a decade now. Much of this litigation has been 
concentrated in Hawaii and California. Nevertheless, in 2008, the Navy 
began to implement an undersea warfare training range on the east 
coast of the United States, and sonar litigation efforts are already be-
ginning there. Thus, Navy sonar litigation is about to become a nation-
wide phenomenon. 
                                                                                                                      
1 United States Navy, Ocean Stewardship: Understanding Sonar, http://www.navy.mil/ 
oceans/sonar.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). In contrast, passive sonar systems merely 




5 Press Release, National Resource Defense Council, Navy Sued over Harm to Whales 
from Mid-Frequency Sonar (Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/press 
releases/051019.asp. “Decibels measure sound intensity or loudness on a logarithmic scale; 
for example, a sound measuring 180 dB is approximately ten times more intense than a 
170 dB sound.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) [Evans I ]. 
6 Natural Resources Defense Council, Protecting Whales from Dangerous Sonar, http:// 
www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sonar.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). 
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 While a detailed review of all of this litigation would exceed the 
limitations of a symposium format, that litigation is summarized in the 
Appendix chart. Most important for this Article is the fact that, to date, 
three different federal district courts—the Northern District of Cali-
fornia,7 the Central District of California,8 and the District of Ha-
waii9— have each issued a narrowly tailored injunction requiring that 
various of the Navy’s sonar training exercises employ mitigation meas-
ures designed to allow such training to proceed while minimizing po-
tential harm to marine wildlife. 
 Nevertheless, on November 12, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Winter v. NRDC (Winter VII ).10 The case involved the Navy’s use of 
MFAS in fourteen large-scale training exercises off the coast of south-
ern California (SOCAL exercises) between February 2007 and January 
2009.11 The Supreme Court vacated the challenged portions of the 
Central District of California’s preliminary injunction, holding that the 
Navy’s interest in effective training and the public interest in national 
defense tipped the balance of equities “strongly” in the Navy’s favor.12 
Indeed, according to the Court, “the proper determination of where 
the public interest lies does not strike us as a close question.”13
 Thus, despite the fact that it acknowledged the “seriousness” of the 
interests in marine mammals, and while the lower courts have engaged 
in complex balancing of public interests, the Supreme Court, like many 
discussions of the Navy sonar litigation and the Navy’s own litigation 
posture,14 essentially figured the controversy over Navy sonar solely in 
terms of a trade-off between two public policy objectives: marine biodi-
versity protection and national security.15 Strikingly absent from the ma-
                                                                                                                      
 
7 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003) [Evans 
II ]. 
8 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [Win-
ter III ], remanded, 513 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2008), reissued, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (C.D. Cal. 
2008), aff’d, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008). 
9 Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Haw. 2008). 
10 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) [Winter VII ]. 
11 Id. at 371. 
12 Id. at 377–78. 
13 Id. at 378. 
14 See, e.g., Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Cohen, No. 98-CV-160, 1998 WL 2017631, at *3 (D. 
Haw. Mar. 9, 1998) (noting the military defendants’ argument “that any delay in the study 
will also delay the decision to employ a low-frequency active sonar submarine detection 
system in coastal waters, thereby compromising the safety of Navy personnel and the na-
tion as a whole.”). 
15 See generally Carolyn M. Chopko, NRDC v. Evans: Northern District of California Delivers 
“Sound” Judgment in Protection of Marine Wildlife Under the MMPA, Restricting Navy’s Use of 
Sonar, 15 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 393 (2004); Nate Cihlar, The Navy and Low Frequency Active Sonar: 
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jority’s opinion was any discussion regarding the legality of the Navy’s 
exercises or of the legality of the environmental exemptions upon which 
it was relying, even though the Council on Environmental Quality’s 
(CEQ’s) “emergency circumstances” exemption from the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) was an issue presented to the Court. 
 While scholars and litigants will undoubtedly be debating the 
meaning of the Supreme Court’s preliminary injunction ruling for 
years to come—and for the record, I think that ruling is best explained 
in light of the Court’s long history of deciding that the military is dif-
ferent when it comes to environmental law16—this Article instead sug-
gests that the Court’s failure to reach the actual legality of the Navy’s 
activities and especially of the environmental law exemptions it relies 
upon is the far more troubling aspect of the case, especially in light of 
the decade-long progression of Navy sonar litigation. Specifically, this 
Article argues that the history of that litigation represents a progressive 
elimination of both the flexibility and effective oversight that could en-
sure that neither national security nor environmental goals are unnec-
essarily sacrificed, in favor of increasingly comprehensive environ-
mental exemptions that generally neither require nor—especially in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision—even allow for consideration of 
either the legitimacy of national security needs or the use of mitigation 
measures. It concludes that, at least in times of (relative) peace, the 
carefully tailored injunctions of the federal district courts are in fact 
more effective tools for balancing important federal interests than the 
binary national security exemptions in the relevant federal environ-
mental statutes, particularly given the lack of procedural or substantive 
coordination among those exemptions. 
I. The Navy’s Sonar and Marine Life 
 Marine mammal strandings were one of the first indications that 
LFAS and MFAS may cause serious harm to marine life. Strandings oc-
                                                                                                                      
Stripping the Endangered Species Act of Its Authority, 28 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
913 (2004); Daniel Inkelas, Security, Sound, and Cetaceans: Legal Challenges to Low Frequency 
Active Sonar Under U.S. and International Environmental Law, 37 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
207 (2005); Joel R. Reynolds, Submarines, Sonar, and the Death of Whales: Enforcing the Delicate 
Balance of Environmental Compliance and National Security Military Training, 32 Wm. & Mary 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 759 (2008); Colleen C. Karpinsky, Comment, A Whale of a Tale: The 
Sea of Controversy Surrounding the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the U.S. Navy’s Proposed 
Use of the SURTASS-LFA Sonar System, 12 Penn. St. Envtl. L. Rev. 389 (2004). 
16 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (refusing to enjoin 
military activities despite a clear violation of the Clean Water Act). 
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cur when marine animals swim or float to shore and become trapped 
on beaches or in shallow water.17 By 2007, “[m]ass strandings of several 
species of whales following naval exercises ha[d] been documented in 
the Bahamas, the Canary Islands, Hawaii, North Carolina, Japan, 
Greece, Spain, Taiwan, the Madeira Archipelago, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.”18 The International Whaling Commission’s Scientific Commit-
tee concluded that the evidence establishes that the Navy’s MFAS is as-
sociated with these strandings; similarly, the Navy’s Office of Naval Re-
search has concluded that the evidence that active sonar causes 
strandings is “completely convincing.”19
 Post-mortem studies of the whales stranded in the Bahamas re-
vealed that they had suffered “hemorrhages in the inner ear, in some 
tissues adjacent to the ear, and in the fluid spaces surrounding the 
brain, as well as clotting in the cerebral ventricles . . . .”20 Later studies 
have also suggested that when whales dive rapidly to avoid active sonar, 
“injuries such as hemorrhaging around the brain, ears, kidneys, and 
acoustic fats, acute spongiotic changes in the central nervous system, 
and gas/fat emboli and lesions in the liver, lungs, and other vital or-
gans” can occur.21 In addition, evidence indicates that “MFA sonar dis-
rupts activities critical to marine mammals’ survival, such as food forag-
ing and mating . . . .”22 Scientific uncertainty over the decibel levels 
required to cause such injuries and behavioral responses has been the 
source of intense debate in the Navy sonar litigation.23
 The Navy’s active sonar potentially affects other marine species, as 
well. In the Northern District of California, litigation has raised issues 
regarding the effects of active sonar on endangered and threatened 
species of sea turtles, Chinook salmon, Coho salmon, chum salmon, 
and steelhead.24 In scientific studies, fish exposed to low-frequency so-
                                                                                                                      
17 Maryann Mott, Whales at Risk from New U.S. Navy Sonar Range, Activists Say, Nat’l Geo-
graphic News, Nov. 3, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/ 41287542. html. 
18 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 8:07-cv-00335-FMC-FMOx, 2007 WL 
2481037, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) [Winter I ]. “The use of MFA sonar is considered a 
plausible, if not likely, contributing factor to a mass stranding of up to 200 melon-headed 
whales in Hanalei Bay, Kauai, following naval exercises conducted by U.S. and Japanese 
vessels during Rim of the Pacific (‘RIMPAC’) 2004.” Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, 546 F. 
Supp. 2d 960, 964 (D. Haw. 2008). 
19 Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 977. 
20 Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
21 Winter I, 2007 WL 2481037, at *5; see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 
518 F.3d 658, 665–67 (9th Cir. 2008) [Winter VI ] (summarizing the studies). 
22 Winter I, 2007 WL 2481037, at *6. 
23 See, e.g., Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 973–75; Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1014–17. 
24 See, e.g., Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. 
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nar “suffered internal injuries at 160 dB, eye damage at 170 dB, audi-
tory damage at 180 dB, and transient stunning at 190 dB.”25 Moreover, 
such studies indicate that fish begin to show avoidance behavior at so-
nar levels as low as 128 dB, with significant reactions at 150 dB.26
II. The Relevant Statutes and Their National  
Security Exemptions 
 A plethora of federal environmental statutes are potentially rele-
vant to the Navy’s use of LFAS and MFAS. Some of these statutory pro-
visions, notably NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) re-
quirement, apply to every use of Navy sonar by virtue of the Navy’s 
status as a federal agency. Application of others, such as the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), Endangered Species Act (ESA), and 
Fur Seal Act, depend on the presence of particular marine species. Fi-
nally, other statutes become relevant based on independent marine 
regulations and policies. These statutes include the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), the relevance of 
which depends largely on the prior existence of fishery management 
plans; the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), application of 
which depends on the relevant state’s coastal zone management plan; 
and the National Marine Sanctuary Act, which becomes relevant only if 
the federal government has already created a national marine sanctu-
ary in the area of LFAS and MFAS activity. 
A. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
 NEPA27 has been the most influential federal environmental stat-
ute in the Navy sonar litigation, as the Winter v. NRDC line of cases sug-
gests. The operative provision of NEPA is its Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) requirement—specifically, that “all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall” draft an EIS for “proposals for legislation 
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment” that addresses five elements, including reason-
able alternatives to the action proposed.28
                                                                                                                      
 
25 Evans II, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
26 Id. 
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000). 
28 Id. § 4332(2)(C). The five elements of an EIS are: (1) “the environmental impact of 
the proposed action”; (2) “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented”; (3) “alternatives to the proposed action”; (4) “the 
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance 
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 Case law has clarified that NEPA’s EIS requirement is purely a pro-
cedural requirement—while the federal agency must perform the envi-
ronmental evaluation, NEPA does not compel that agency to choose 
the least environmentally damaging alternative.29 Nevertheless, case law 
and the CEQ’s regulations require that federal agencies perform the 
environmental impact analysis as early in the decision-making process 
as possible,30 in order to allow the agency to identify unintended envi-
ronmental consequences31 and potentially less damaging alternatives32 
before it has committed itself to a particular course of action.33 Failure 
to comply with NEPA is grounds for reversing the agency’s final deci-
sion. 
 The CEQ regulations define “federal agency” to be “all agencies of 
the Federal Government,” excluding Congress, the judiciary, and the 
president.34 Thus, the Navy is generally subject to NEPA’s requirements. 
Moreover, NEPA itself contains no express exemptions from its EIS re-
quirement.35 Similarly, the CEQ’s regulations state most broadly that 
“[a]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with these regu-
lations.”36 However, the CEQ also expresses an intent to “allow each 
agency flexibility” in implementing NEPA,37 and its regulations antici-
pate variations in how NEPA applies. 
 Two such CEQ-allowed variations are relevant to the Navy sonar 
litigation. In Winter v. NRDC, the CEQ invoked its “emergency circum-
                                                                                                                      
and enhancement of long-term productivity”; and (5) “any irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented.” Id. 
29 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
30 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5, 1506.10 (2008). 
31 Id. § 1502.16. 
32 Id. § 1502.14. 
33 Id. § 1500.1(c) (“The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make deci-
sions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions 
that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”); id. § 1502.1 (“The primary purpose 
of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that 
the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and ac-
tions of the Federal Government.”). 
34 Id. § 1508.12. 
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(a) (“Federal agencies shall to 
the fullest extent possible . . . [i]nterpret and administer the policies, regulations, and public 
laws of the United States in accordance with the policies set forth in the Act and in these 
regulations.”); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (repeating 42 U.S.C. § 4333 and adding that “[t]he phrase 
‘to the fullest extent possible’ in [42 U.S.C. § 4332] means that each agency of the Federal 
Government shall comply with that section unless existing law applicable to the agency’s 
operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible.” (emphasis added)). 
36 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1. 
37 Id. 
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stances” regulations.38 Under these regulations, “[w]here emergency 
circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant envi-
ronmental impact without observing” normal NEPA procedures, “the 
Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council about 
alternative arrangements.”39 Both the Central District of California and 
the Ninth Circuit determined that no emergency circumstances existed 
to justify alternative NEPA compliance measures.40 As noted, although 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in part to address the propriety 
of this exception, the majority never reached the issue.41
 Second, the CEQ has more specifically addressed the particular 
needs of national security in the NEPA EIS process.42 However, the 
Navy has not invoked this NEPA national security exemption, probably 
because that exemption focuses on maintaining the secrecy of classified 
information and projects43—not on shortcutting the required environ-
mental analysis or eliminating the potential need for mitigation meas-
ures. 
B. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) 
 The MMPA44 protects all marine mammals45 under U.S. jurisdic-
tion through a general moratorium on the “taking” of such species.46 As 
defined in the Act, “[t]he term ‘take’ means to harass, hunt, capture, or 
kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal.”47
 The Navy’s use of its LFAS and MFAS can both “kill” and “harass” 
marine mammals, creating a prima facie violation of the MMPA. The 
definition of “kill” is perhaps obvious. The National Marine Fisheries 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Decision Memorandum Accepting Alternative Arrangements for the U.S. Navy’s 
Southern California Operating Area Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEXs) 
and Joint Task Force Exercises ( JTFEXs) Scheduled to Occur Between Today and January 
2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 4189, 4189 ( Jan. 24, 2008) (accepting the CEQ’s alternative proce-
dures). 
39 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. 
40 Winter VI, 518 F.3d 658, 687 (9th Cir. 2008); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Win-
ter, 527 F. Supp. 2d. 1216, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [Winter V ]. 
41 But see Winter VII, 129 S. Ct. 365, 390–91 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing 
with the lower courts that use of the “emergency circumstances” exception was inappro-
priate). 
42 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c). 
43 Id. 
44 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2006). 
45 See id. § 1362(6) (defining “marine mammal”). 
46 Id. § 1371(a). 
47 Id. § 1362(13). 
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Service’s (NMFS’s) definitions of “harass” create two kinds of harass-
ment: 
Level A Harassment means any act of pursuit, torment, or an-
noyance which has the potential to injure a marine mammal 
or marine mammal stock in the wild. 
Level B Harassment means any act of pursuit, torment, or an-
noyance which has the potential to disturb a marine mammal 
or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of 
behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, 
breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering but which 
does not have the potential to injure a marine mammal or 
marine mammal stock in the wild.48
Notably, these definitions count as “harassment” any action “which has 
the potential” to interfere with marine mammals, effectively placing the 
burden on the actor to protect marine mammals. 
 The MMPA establishes a number of exceptions to its taking mora-
torium. Most relevant to the Navy sonar litigation, the Act allows for 
incidental take permits (ITPs).49 For activities other than commercial 
fishing, NMFS may issue an ITP only for a “specified activity” taking 
place within “a specified geographical region,” where the activity might 
result in an “incidental, but not intentional” take of “small numbers of 
marine mammals of a species or population stock. . . .”50 In addition, 
the total take must “have a negligible impact on such species or stock,” 
and NMFS must promulgate regulations specifying both “permissible 
methods of taking pursuant to such activity, and other means of effect-
ing the least practicable adverse impact on such species or stock and its 
habitat, paying particular attention to rookeries, mating grounds, and 
areas of similar significance” and “requirements pertaining to the 
monitoring and reporting of such taking.”51 ITPs can last up to five 
years, but NMFS must withdraw the permit if either the regulations are 
inadequate or the incidental take is having more than a negligible im-
pact on the species or stock.52
 Significantly, perhaps, the Navy has treated its LFAS and MFAS dif-
ferently for purposes of the MMPA. For its SURTASS LFAS system, the 
                                                                                                                      
48 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (2008). 
49 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(i). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B). 
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Navy sought—and in 2002 NMFS granted—an ITP.53 NMFS’s 2002 
LFAS incidental take regulation54 divided the world into 15 biomes55 
and allowed “incidental take by Level A and Level B harassment” of 
eleven species of baleen whales, twenty-two species of toothed whales 
and dolphins, and fifteen species of seals and sea lions.56 The actual 
ITP consisted of a yearly “Letter of Authorization” for specific activities, 
and authorized activities had to “be conducted in a manner that mini-
mizes, to the greatest extent practicable, any adverse impacts on marine 
mammals, their habitat, and the availability of marine mammals for 
subsistence uses.”57 The regulations also established: (1) a series of 
mitigation measures designed to ensure that no marine mammals were 
subjected to sounds of greater than 180 dB;58 and (2) extensive moni-
toring requirements.59 The 2002 regulation also established four “off-
shore areas of critical biological importance for marine mammals”60 
and allowed proponents to petition NMFS to designate additional Bio-
logically Important Marine Mammal Areas.61
 Despite successful challenges in court, the 2002 regulation re-
mained effective through August 15, 2007.62 Nevertheless, the North-
ern District of California’s 2002 preliminary injunction required the 
Navy to mitigate its use of LFAS beyond what was required in the regu-
lation,63 a conclusion it confirmed in response to the parties’ later 
cross-motions for summary judgment.64
 Responding to this litigation, in 2003 Congress amended the 
MMPA’s ITP requirements for military readiness activities.65 As a result 
of these amendments, the MMPA now provides that: 
                                                                                                                      
 
53 Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy Operations of Surveillance Towed Array 
Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,712, 46,712 ( July 16, 2002) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216). 
54 Id. 
55 50 C.F.R. § 216.180(a) (2002). 
56 Id. § 216.180(b). 
57 Id. § 216.182. 
58 Id. § 216.184. 
59 Id. § 216.185. 
60 Id. § 216.184(f). 
61 50 C.F.R. § 216.191 (2002). 
62 Id. § 216.181. 
63 Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
64 Evans II, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2003). For a more detailed discus-
sion of the regulation and the litigation, see Karpinsky, supra note 15, at 397–407. 
65 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–136, sec. 319, 
§§ 3(18), 101, 101(a)(5), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433–35 (2003). “Military readiness activity” in-
cludes “all training and operations of the Armed Forces that relate to combat” and “the ade-
quate and realistic testing of military equipment, vehicles, weapons, and sensors for proper 
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For a military readiness activity . . . a determination of “least 
practicable adverse impact on such species or stock” . . . shall 
include consideration of personnel safety, practicality of im-
plementation, and impact on the effectiveness of the military 
readiness activity. Before making the required determination, 
the Secretary shall consult with the Department of Defense 
regarding personnel safety, practicality of implementation, 
and impact on the effectiveness of the military readiness activ-
ity.66
The amendments also changed the definition of “harassment.” For 
military readiness activities, “harassment” means: 
(i) any act that injures or has the significant potential to injure 
a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild; or 
(ii) any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mam-
mal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disrup-
tion of natural behavioral patterns, including, but not limited 
to, migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or shel-
tering, to a point where such behavioral patterns are aban-
doned or significantly altered.67
Acts that fit within subparagraph (i) qualify as Level A harassment, 
while those that fall within subparagraph (ii) are Level B harassment.68
 Thus, in the 2003 amendments, Congress effectively granted the 
military greater freedom to injure marine mammals or to disrupt their 
behavior than the MMPA would otherwise allow. For the SOCAL exer-
cises at issue in Winter v. NRDC, the Navy concluded that Level A har-
assments would occur if whales and dolphins were exposed to sonar 
levels of 215 dB or greater, while Level B harassment events would oc-
cur when such cetaceans were exposed to sonar levels between 173 dB 
and 215 dB.69
 Congress also added a general national defense exception to the 
MMPA through the 2003 amendments.70 Under this exemption: 
                                                                                                                      
operation and suitability for combat use.” Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–314, § 315(f)(1), 116 Stat. 2458, 2510 (2002). 
66 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2006). 
67 Id. § 1362(18)(B). 
68 Id. § 1362(18)(C)–(D). 
69 See Winter VI, 518 F.3d 658, 668 (9th Cir. 2008). 
70 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, sec. 319(b), § 101, 117 Stat. 
at 1434 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f) (2006)). 
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The Secretary of Defense, after conferring with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, or both, as appro-
priate, may exempt any action or category of actions under-
taken by the Department of Defense or its components from 
compliance with any requirement of this chapter, if the Secre-
tary determines that it is necessary for national defense.71
The exemption cannot last longer than two years,72 and the Secretary 
must fairly immediately report the exemption to the Committees on 
Armed Services in both the House and the Senate.73
 The Navy first invoked this new exemption for its 2006 Pacific Rim 
war games.74 Moreover, in January of 2007, the Navy again invoked this 
exemption, this time for all MFAS training activities for two years.75 As a 
result, from January 2007 through January 2009, the MMPA became 
irrelevant in the MFAS-focused litigation, including Winter v. NRDC and 
MFAS litigation in the Hawaii District Court.76
 However, LFAS remains governed by the ITP, and hence the 
MMPA remains a live issue in the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Gutierrez LFAS litigation in the Northern District of California.77 NMFS 
finalized its new SURTASS LFAS regulations in August 2007,78 and 
these regulations are intended to remain in effect until August 15, 
2012.79 The 2007 regulations are very similar to the 2002 regulations, 
except that NMFS eliminated the biome approach80 and has now des-
ignated ten Biologically Important Marine Mammal Areas.81
C. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) 
 To date, the ESA has been most relevant in the Northern District 
of California litigation, which explicitly reviewed the effects of the 
                                                                                                                      
71 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f)(1). 
72 Id. § 1371(f)(2)(B). 
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Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,846 (Aug. 21, 
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Navy’s LFAS on sea turtles and fish as well as marine mammals.82 In 
order to qualify for protection under the ESA,83 a species must be 
“listed” by either the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (terrestrial species) or 
NMFS (marine and anadromous species).84 Moreover, with the listing, 
the relevant agency is supposed to designate the species’ critical habi-
tat.85
 A number of marine and anadromous species have been listed for 
protection under the ESA.86 Once listed, a species receives two sets of 
protections, both of which are relevant to the Navy’s sonar activities. 
First, section 7 imposes duties on federal agencies, which the Act de-
fines as “any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United 
States.”87 Pursuant to section 7(a)(1), federal agencies must “carry[] 
out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threat-
ened species” listed under the Act, while under section 7(a)(2) every 
federal agency must “insure that any action authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in 
the destruction or adverse modification of” its critical habitat.88
 Second, section 9 prohibits “any person subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States” from taking endangered species “within the 
United States or the territorial sea of the United States” or “upon the 
high seas.”89 In addition, it is illegal for any such person to violate any 
regulation governing any listed species,90 which generally serves to ex-
tend the “take” prohibition to threatened species as well.91 The ESA’s 
definition of “person” explicitly includes “any officer, employee, agent, 
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government,”92 and 
hence these prohibitions also apply to the Navy. 
                                                                                                                      
82 Evans II, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1175–88 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
83 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
84 Id. §§ 1532(15), 1533(a)(1)–(2). 
85 Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
86 See Office of Protected Resources, NOAA Fisheries, Species Under the Endangered 
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88 Id. § 1536(a)(1)–(2). 
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 Under the ESA, “[t]he term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to en-
gage in any such conduct.”93 According to NOAA’s regulations: 
Harass in the definition of “take” in the Act means an inten-
tional or negligent act or omission which creates the likeli-
hood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to 
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, 
but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.94
“Harm,” in contrast, is “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. 
Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation 
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essen-
tial behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”95
 The ESA also defines its relationship to the MMPA. In general, “no 
provision of [the ESA] shall take precedence over any more restrictive 
conflicting provision of the [MMPA].”96 As a result, dually protected 
species like the North Atlantic right whale enjoy the benefit of the most 
protective provisions in either Act. 
 In 2003, Congress amended the ESA to provide the Department of 
Defense with exemptions from critical habitat designations.97 However, 
very few marine and anadromous species have critical habitat desig-
nated at all, and Congress explicitly preserved the requirements that 
the military comply with the section 7(a)(2) “consultation” require-
ment and the section 9 “take” prohibition.98 Thus, this Department of 
Defense exemption has not been relevant—and is unlikely to become 
relevant—to the Navy’s use of active sonar. 
 Nevertheless, since 1978, any federal agency may seek an exemp-
tion from the requirements of section 7(a)(2) from the Endangered 
Species Committee.99 While this “God Squad” has only rarely allowed 
such exemptions, the ESA explicitly provides that the Committee must 
“grant an exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense 
finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national secu-
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. § 1532(19). 
94 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
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96 16 U.S.C. § 1543. 
97 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–136, sec. 318, 
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rity.”100 However, given that NMFS has not yet found that the Navy’s 
active sonar jeopardizes a listed species, the Navy has not yet invoked 
this exemption procedure. 
 The ESA provides a number of exemptions from the section 9 
“take” prohibition. Of these, the section 7 incidental take statement 
(ITS) has been most relevant to the Navy sonar litigation. In connec-
tion with formal consultation pursuant to section 7(a)(2), NMFS will 
issue a formal Biological Opinion,101 and this Biological Opinion may 
contain an ITS that exempts the acting federal agency from section 9 
“take” liability.102 However, if the species concerned is a marine mam-
mal, the taking must also be authorized under the MMPA’s incidental 
take provisions and comply with those MMPA requirements.103
 In February 2007, the Navy completed its section 7 formal consul-
tation with NMFS regarding MFAS training activities.104 NMFS issued its 
Biological Opinion on February 9, 2007, and included a blanket ITS 
that exempted MFAS activities from section 9 liability through January 
2009.105 Notably, the lower courts in Winter v. NRDC found that the 
plaintiffs had not shown likely violations of the ESA with respect to 
MFAS training.106 However, the ESA ITS covers only MFAS, and in 2008 
the Northern District of California still found likely violations of the 
ESA with respect to SURTASS LFAS.107
D. Fur Seal Act 
 The Fur Seal Act of 1966108 implements the Convention on the 
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals.109 Although limited in scope, 
it has been raised (unsuccessfully) in at least two rounds of Navy sonar 
litigation. 
 The heart of the Fur Seal Act is its prohibition110 on the taking of 
the North Pacific Fur seal111 in the North Pacific Ocean, which the Act 
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. § 1536(j). 
101 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4), (h) (2007). 
102 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i). 
103 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iii). 
104 Decision Memorandum, supra note 38, at 4190. 
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defines rather specifically as “the waters of the Pacific Ocean north of 
the thirtieth parallel of north latitude, including the Bering, Okhotsk, 
and Japan Seas.”112 Nevertheless, given the Navy’s far-ranging use of 
LFAS and MFAS, this geographic restriction will be met at least some of 
the time, and the Fur Seal Act’s definition of “person” explicitly in-
cludes “any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of 
the Federal Government . . . .”113 “Take” and “taking” mean “to harass, 
hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill.”114 
Therefore, if the Navy operated its active sonar in the North Pacific 
Ocean and harassed or killed fur seals, it could “take” those seals in vio-
lation of the Act. 
 The Fur Seal Act has limited exceptions. The two most important 
allow Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos to take fur seals for subsistence pur-
poses115 and takings for scientific research purposes.116 Unlike the 
MMPA, Congress has not amended the Fur Seal Act to provide excep-
tions or lower burdens of proof for national security, national defense, 
or the military. 
E. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) 
 The MSA117 seeks to conserve and manage commercially important 
fish stocks118 by establishing eight regional fishery management councils 
(FMCs).119 FMCs regulate important fish stocks through fishery man-
agement plans (FMPs),120 which they must promulgate in accordance 
with a series of national standards.121 The Secretary of Commerce,122 
acting through NMFS (NOAA Fisheries), reviews the Councils’ FMPs.123
 Much of the MSA regulates foreign and domestic fishing activities 
and hence would seem inapplicable to the Navy’s use of MFAS and 
LFAS. However, the MSA prohibits “any person” from “violat[ing] any 
provision of this chapter or any regulation or permit issued pursuant to 
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this chapter”124 and generally prohibits fishing in state or federal waters 
except as in compliance with applicable law.125 Moreover, the MSA de-
fines “fishing” to be: 
(A) the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; 
(B) the attempted catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; 
(C) any other activity which can reasonably be expected to re-
sult in the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; or 
(D) any operations at sea in support of, or in preparation for, 
any activity described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).126
While the Act itself does not define “take,” NOAA’s regulations broadly 
provide that “[c]atch, take, or harvest includes, but is not limited to, any 
activity that results in killing any fish . . . .”127 Finally, the “persons” sub-
ject to the Act explicitly include the federal government and “any entity 
of any such government.”128 Thus, if the Navy’s SONAR kills fish in vio-
lation of an FMP or conservation-related regulations, the Navy could 
violate the MSA. 
 The MSA contains no general exemptions for national security, 
national defense, or the military. Moreover, the MSA’s prohibitions on 
violating the Act, its implementing regulations, or permits issued under 
the Act apply without exception to all “persons.” 
 Nevertheless, the Navy is entitled to some relief from the more 
specific requirement that vessels fish in accordance with state and fed-
eral law. This requirement applies only to vessels “other than a vessel of 
the United States,” and owners or operators of vessels “other than a ves-
sel of the United States.”129 Vessels of the United States, in contrast, are 
prohibited only from transferring fish illegally to foreign vessels within 
the United States’ exclusive economic zone and from illegally fishing in 
foreign waters.130 Thus, the MSA makes it difficult for the Navy’s sonar 
operations to create liability in domestic waters for fishing without a 
permit. 
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F. Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 
 Both the California and the Hawaii litigation have raised issues 
under the CZMA. The CZMA131 encourages states to protect their 
coastal zones132 by providing federal incentives—financial and other-
wise—to states that enact Coastal Zone Management Plans (CZMPs).133 
From the Navy’s perspective, the most important incentive that Con-
gress created was the federal consistency provision, which requires that 
“[e]ach Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that 
affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone 
shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum 
extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State man-
agement programs.”134
 Under the Act, the “coastal zone” can be a rather limited area— 
“the coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and 
the adjacent shorelands (including the waters therein and thereunder), 
strongly influenced by each other and in proximity to the shorelines of 
the several coastal states . . . .”135 Nevertheless, the consistency require-
ment applies to federal activities occurring within or outside of the 
coastal zone, so long as those activities could affect resources within the 
state’s coastal zone. Given that active sonar sound waves travel far un-
derwater, MFAS and LFAS can trigger (and have triggered) the CZMA’s 
consistency requirement. Of course, what “consistency” actually re-
quires depends on the details of each state’s CZMP. 
 The CZMA empowers the President to exempt any federal activity 
from the consistency requirement.136 However, the President’s exemp-
tion authority is not unbridled. First, the President must wait until there 
is an appealable judgment that the federal activity will violate the con-
sistency requirement.137 Second, the Secretary of Commerce must cer-
tify that mediation is unlikely to result in compliance.138 Third, the Sec-
retary of Commerce must request an exemption from the President in 
writing.139 Fourth, the President must “determine[] that the activity is 
in the paramount interest of the United States” before granting the ex-
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emption.140 Finally, “[n]o such exemption shall be granted on the basis 
of a lack of appropriations unless the President has specifically re-
quested such appropriations as part of the budgetary process, and the 
Congress has failed to make available the requested appropriations.”141
 President George W. Bush invoked this exemption for the first 
time during the Winters v. NRDC litigation, but the validity of the presi-
dential order was not at issue before the U.S. Supreme Court. However, 
the Central District of California raised concerns about the constitu-
tionality of the CZMA exemption procedure that may become impor-
tant in future litigation.142
G. National Marine Sanctuary Act (NMSA) 
 The NMSA143 allows the Secretary of Commerce (acting through 
NOAA) to designate “any discrete area of the marine environment as a 
national marine sanctuary” if: (1) “the area is of special national signifi-
cance”; (2) the area needs protection; and (3) the area is manage-
able.144 Once designated, each sanctuary is managed according to a 
federal management plan.145
 The NMSA makes it illegal for “any person to . . . destroy, cause the 
loss of, or injure any sanctuary resource managed under law or regula-
tions for that sanctuary.”146 Moreover, “[a]ny person who destroys, 
causes the loss of, or injures any sanctuary resource is liable to the 
United States for an amount equal to the sum of . . . the amount of re-
sponse costs and damages resulting from the destruction, loss, or in-
jury,” plus interest.147 A “sanctuary resource” is “any living or nonliving 
resource of a national marine sanctuary that contributes to the conser-
vation, recreational, ecological, historical, educational, cultural, archeo-
logical, scientific, or aesthetic value of the sanctuary.”148 The Act does 
not define “person,” but NOAA’s implementing regulations provide 
that “persons” include “any officer, employee, agent, department, 
                                                                                                                      
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See Winter V, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1232–38 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
143 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1445c-1 (2006). 
144 See id. § 1433(a). 
145 Id. § 1434(a)(2)(C). 
146 Id. § 1436(1). 
147 Id. § 1443(a)(1). 
148 Id. § 1432(8). 
372 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:353 
agency or instrumentality of the Federal government . . . .”149 Thus, the 
Navy is subject to the NMSA. 
 In addition, once a sanctuary is designated, federal agencies must 
consult with the Secretary of Commerce when their activities could af-
fect sanctuary resources;150 thus, the Navy’s sonar could be subject to 
this consultation requirement. The Secretary “shall . . . recommend 
reasonable and prudent alternatives, which may include conduct of the 
action elsewhere,” in order to protect sanctuary resources.151 If the act-
ing agency declines to follow the Secretary’s recommendations, the 
agency head must explain the reasons for refusing in writing.152 More-
over: 
If the head of a Federal agency takes an action other than an 
alternative recommended by the Secretary and such action 
results in the destruction of, loss of, or injury to a sanctuary 
resource, the head of the agency shall promptly prevent and 
mitigate further damage and restore or replace the sanctuary 
resource in a manner approved by the Secretary.153
 Of course, the NMSA’s requirements apply only if the Navy’s op-
erations could affect a designated National Marine Sanctuary. There 
are only thirteen National Marine Sanctuaries, plus the Papahãnaumo-
kuãkea Marine National Monument in the northwest Hawaiian Is-
lands.154 To date, therefore, the NMSA has been most relevant to Navy 
operations off of Hawaii and California, although it may become rele-
vant in the future to the Navy’s planned sonar operations in the Atlan-
tic Ocean and around Florida. 
 The NMSA contains no explicit exemption for national defense, 
military, or national security activities. However, NOAA can issue special 
use permits to allow certain activities to occur in a National Marine 
Sanctuary that would otherwise be prohibited.155 In order to issue the 
permit, NOAA must “determine[] such authorization is necessary . . . 
to establish conditions of access to and use of any sanctuary resource; 
or . . . to promote public use and understanding of a sanctuary re-
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source.”156 These conditions are unlikely to apply to the Navy’s use of 
LFAS and MFAS, although individual sanctuary management plans 
could well exempt certain military activities. 
 The NMSA does create defenses to liability for the destruction of 
sanctuary resources that might apply to the Navy’s use of active sonar 
near a National Marine Sanctuary. Specifically, a person is not liable if 
“the destruction or loss of, or injury to, the sanctuary resource was 
caused solely by . . . an act of war, . . . and the person acted with due 
care”; if “the destruction, loss, or injury was caused by an activity au-
thorized by Federal or State law”; or if “the destruction, loss, or injury 
was negligible.”157 The first defense might be relevant if the Navy oper-
ates its sonar in exact compliance with a federal court order or NOAA’s 
recommendations after the NMSA consultation. Moreover, because 
military readiness training is also generally authorized under federal 
law, the second defense might also be generally available to the Navy. 
III. Environmental Exemptions and Winter v. NRDC 
 Although the Supreme Court did not reach these issues, Winter v. 
NRDC highlights many of the complications that can result from mili-
tary activities, multiple federal environmental statutes, and multiple 
exemption requirements and procedures. 
 Originally, in January 2006, plaintiffs sought a temporary restrain-
ing order (TRO) against the Navy’s use of active sonar in its Pacific Rim 
war games, filing the related complaint in June of 2006.158 As then filed, 
the plaintiffs would have raised challenges under the MMPA as well as 
other statutes. However, two days after NRDC filed the lawsuit, the De-
partment of Defense invoked the MMPA’s new national defense exemp-
tion.159 Nevertheless, the district court issued a TRO on July 3, 2006, 
prompting a settlement among the parties.160 The court then dismissed 
the case with prejudice but retained jurisdiction to ensure that the Navy 
implemented the mitigation measures that the settlement required.161
 Five environmental groups and Jean-Michel Cousteau then filed a 
new action on March 22, 2007, alleging claims under NEPA, the ESA, 
and the CZMA in response to the Navy’s determination to conduct the 
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SOCAL exercises without mitigation.162 In response to the plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the Central District of California 
concluded that NMFS’s February 2007 Biological Opinion and ITS 
complied with section 7 of the ESA and hence denied an injunction on 
ESA grounds,163 despite the fact that the Navy predicted that its SOCAL 
exercises would result in 710 takes of blue whales, fin whales, hump-
back whales, sei whales, and sperm whales, all of which are listed for 
protection under the ESA.164
 The CZMA issue, however, became more interesting. The Navy 
concluded that it did not have to discuss its use of MFAS in its federal 
consistency determination submitted to the California Coastal Com-
mission (CCC), on grounds that MFAS use would occur outside Cali-
fornia’s coastal zone and hence would not affect the state’s coastal re-
sources.165 In addition, it failed to implement the CCC’s proposed 
mitigation measures.166 Both the Central District of California and 
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Navy’s logic, emphasizing that MFAS 
would send potentially damaging sound into California’s coastal wa-
ters.167 In response to these courts’ injunctions, on January 15, 2008, 
President George W. Bush exempted the SOCAL exercises from the 
CZMA’s consistency requirements.168 As a result, the CZMA compliance 
dropped out of the lawsuit at the Supreme Court—although the Cen-
tral District of California expressed “significant concerns about the 
constitutionality” of that presidential exemption.169
 In its Environmental Assessment under NEPA, the Navy predicted 
that its SOCAL exercises would result in “approximately 170,000 in-
stances of Level B harassment” under the MMPA, including permanent 
injury to 436 of the estimated 1211 remaining Cuvier’s beaked 
whales.170 Nevertheless, and especially in light of the Department of 
Defense’s 2007 invocation of the MMPA national security exemption 
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for all Navy MFAS activities, the Navy concluded that a full EIS was un-
necessary and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact instead.171
 In 2007 and very early 2008, both the Central District of California 
and the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail 
on their claims that the Navy violated NEPA.172 In response, on January 
15, 2008, the CEQ found, pursuant to its regulations, that “emergency 
circumstances” existed, allowing the Navy to proceed through abbrevi-
ated NEPA procedures.173 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for 
reconsideration,174 but the Central District of California concluded that 
no emergency circumstances existed to justify the CEQ’s alternative 
arrangements under NEPA175 and that a preliminary injunction was 
still warranted even in the absence of the CZMA claim.176 Ten days 
later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.177
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 23, 2008.178 As 
framed by the Navy petitioners, the two issues that the Court would ad-
dress were: (1) “Whether CEQ permissibly construed its own regulation 
in finding ‘emergency circumstances’”; and (2) “Whether, in any event, 
the preliminary injunction, based on a preliminary finding that the 
Navy had not satisfied NEPA’s procedural requirements, is inconsistent 
with established equitable principles limiting discretionary injunctive 
relief.”179
 Thus, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, only the 
most procedural of the myriad of potential environmental statutes that 
might have informed the Navy’s conduct of its MFAS exercises— 
NEPA—was still at issue (although, of course, the Navy was found to 
have probably complied with the ESA). As noted, the Supreme Court 
did not even reach that issue, deciding the case instead on the propriety 
of injunctive relief.180 The validity of the many environmental exemp-
tions upon which the Navy relied received different levels of judicial re-
view, and the Navy completed its training exercises without any decision 
                                                                                                                      
171 Winter I, 2007 WL 2481037, at *1, *4. 
172 Winter II, 508 F.3d at 885; Winter III, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–17; Winter I, 2007 WL 
2481037, at *5–*7. 
173 Winter V, 527 F. Supp. 2d. at 1224–25. 
174 Winter IV, 513 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2008). 
175 Winter V, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1225–32. 
176 Id. at 1238–39. 
177 Winter VI, 518 F.3d 658, 703 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008)rev’d 
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
178 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2964, 2964 (2008). 
179 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at *I, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239), 2008 WL 859374, at *I. 
180 See Winter VII, 129 S.Ct. 365, 381 (2008). 
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on the merits of the litigation, in potential derogation of both federal 
environmental law and Congress’s recognition of states’ interests in 
their coastal zones. Because the SOCAL exercises ended in January 
2009, many of the remaining challenges are arguably now moot, calling 
into question the courts’ abilities to police such national security activi-
ties. 
Conclusion: The Procedural Component of Balancing National 
Security and Environmental Policies 
 In issuing the first permanent injunction against the Navy’s un-
mitigated use of LFAS in 2003, the Northern District of California rec-
ognized both that “the public interest in military preparedness and 
protection against enemy submarine attacks through early detection is 
of grave importance” and that “the public interest in protecting the 
world’s oceans and the sea creatures that depend upon the oceanic en-
vironment to survive is also of the highest importance.”181 It and the 
two other district courts that have handled Navy sonar litigation so far 
have balanced these two important public interests by issuing narrowly 
tailored rather than blanket injunctions against the use of LFAS and 
MFAS, and by imposing mitigation measures upon rather than stop-
ping the Navy’s activities entirely. Thus, the courts so far have tended to 
agree with NRDC policy analyst Michael Jasny, who declared in settling 
the most recent Hawaii litigation: “‘We don’t have to choose between 
national security and protecting the environment . . . .’”182
 As the use of environmental exemptions in the Winter v. NRDC line 
of cases makes clear, however, there is no uniform national standard for 
determining exactly when and how national defense activities must 
comply with environmental requirements, and the Navy wants to en-
gage in active sonar training without mitigation. With the exception of 
the ESA’s ITS and the MMPA’s national defense exemption, the ex-
emptions it has invoked in the Winter cases, unlike the equitable power 
of the courts, are inherently binary: the activity is either subject to the 
environmental requirements or it is not. Moreover, in this litigation, the 
ITS as well has been employed in a binary fashion, completely exempt-
ing MFAS activities from section 9. By its very nature, therefore, the 
                                                                                                                      
181 Evans II, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003). 
182 Carolyn Whetzel, Navy Department Agrees to Limit Use of Low-Frequency Sonar in Pacific 
Ocean, 157 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) A–5 (Aug. 14, 2008); see also Reynolds, supra note 15, at 
801–02 (emphasizing that the court injunctions have underscored NRDC’s position that 
balancing is possible). 
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Winter litigation suggests that most of the existing national security ex-
emptions in the environmental statutes are excessively blunt instru-
ments that do not allow adequate balancing of two important public 
policies, especially during peacetime. 
 Perhaps more importantly, there is also no necessary coordination 
or oversight of the military’s invocation of national security exemp-
tions. Exemptions from the MMPA are entirely within the discretion of 
the Department of Defense, while exemptions from the CZMA rest 
solely with the President—but only after a court has found that the 
military is violating the federal consistency requirement and the mili-
tary refuses to compromise. Thus, a CZMA exemption becomes avail-
able only after the military has been found to be actually violating fed-
eral law. NEPA contains no real national security exemption at all, 
leading to the stretching of the CEQ’s emergency circumstances excep-
tion in the Winter decisions. Finally, in the national security context, the 
ESA’s normally rigorous Endangered Species Committee process is sub-
ject to the Secretary of Defense’s determination that the exemption is 
necessary for reasons of national security. Whether the Committee 
members can or would challenge the Secretary’s determination of ne-
cessity remains an untested but intriguing question. That question, 
however, underscores a more basic one for these national security ex-
emptions: Who watches the watchmen? 
 One would think that if a military activity—such as the Navy’s 
training exercises involving MFAS and LFAS—were a candidate for ex-
emption from the various national environmental policies, comprehen-
sive evaluation of the potential exemptions from specific environmental 
statutes would be of benefit to both the military and to the public. In 
addition, a more centralized and comprehensive exemption review 
process could allow a more nuanced approach to the balancing of na-
tional security and environmental interests than the binary exemption 
provisions currently allow, avoiding blanket prohibitions on important 
military training exercises while at the same time producing closer 
analysis of what mitigation measures are feasible and advisable rather 
than allowing unbridled military discretion to inflict environmental 
harms in peacetime. 
 To be sure, the MMPA ITP and ESA ITS exemptions already allow 
for the imposition of mitigation measures. Moreover, an active balanc-
ing approach is messy, complex, and subject to trial-and-error revisions, 
such as when the Hawaii District Court revised its preliminary injunc-
tion in May 2008 in response to the Navy’s actual experiences with the 
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mitigation restrictions in its March 2008 training exercises.183 Neverthe-
less, allowing for such adaptive management and oversight can force 
both the military and the environmental community to figure out when 
exactly—if ever—environmental policies and national security are ir-
refutably and unavoidably in conflict. Taking its cue from the district 
courts, Congress should therefore adopt exemption procedures that 
require the acquisition of such information before a binary choice is 
made to sacrifice either national security or marine biodiversity. Such 
comprehensive review and flexibility would best serve both public poli-
cies at stake as well as the overall public interest in the oceans. 
                                                                                                                      
183 Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, No. 07-0024 DAE-LEK, 2008 WL 2020406, at *2–*6 
(D. Haw. May 9, 2008). 
Appendix: Navy Sonar Litigation 
Name of Litigation,  Opinion(s), and Court(s) Claim(s)/Cause(s) of Action & Resolution(s) Type, Purpose, and Location of Sonar Use 
Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Cohen 
 
No. 98-CV-160, 1998 WL 2017631 (D. Haw.




164 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1998) 
 
 
NEPA, [MMPA], [ESA] 
The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion 
for a preliminary injunction because they 
did not show irreparable harm or a 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, plus noted 
that the issues were now moot because 
testing was complete. 
 
 
Use of LFAS adjacent to the west coast of 
Hawaii specifically to test its effects on 
humpback and sperm whales. 
Kanoa Inc. v. Clinton 
1 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D. Haw. 1998) 
 
NEPA, MMPA, ESA, Fur Seal Act 
Plaintiff whale watching tour company 
lacked standing under the Administrative 
Procedure Act to bring NEPA, ESA, and 
MMPA claims, and the Fur Seal Act did 
not provide a cause of action. 
 
Use of LFAS about 10 miles off the island 
of Hawaii to test its effects on humpback 
and sperm whales (Phase III testing by 
Navy). 
Haw. County Green Party v. Clinton 
 









Case was moot because the Navy finished 
its testing in March 1998 and its permits 
expired in July 1998. 
 
 
NEPA, ESA, MMPA 
The district court determined that 
 
 
Use of LFAS off the Kona coast of the 
island of Hawaii to test its effects on 




Deployment of LFAS defense system in 
Hawaiian waters. 
reopening the prior litigation was not 
warranted. Plaintiffs’ ESA claims failed for 
failure to comply with the citizen suit 
notice requirement. Their MMPA claims, 
based on the Navy’s incidental take permit 
application, were not ripe. Their NEPA 
claims were not yet actionable because the 
Navy’s commitments of resources were not 
“final agency actions” under the APA and 
the EIS was not finalized. The groups 
lacked standing to challenge the Navy’s 
use of SURTASS LFAS elsewhere in the 
world. 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Navy 
No. CV-01-07781 CAS(RZX), 2002 WL 
32095131 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) 
 
 
NEPA, ESA, MMPA, MSA 
While the district court denied the Navy’s 
motion for summary judgment arguing 
that neither NEPA nor the ESA applies 
extraterritorially, it agreed with the Navy 
that LWAD is not a “program” requiring 
either a programmatic EIS under NEPA 
or programmatic consultation and review 
under the ESA. 
 
 
The Navy’s Littoral Warfare Advanced 
Development (LWAD) program, which 
had supported or overseen at least 17 sea 
tests of advanced anti-submarine 
technology since 1996, including active 
SONAR. 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans 
 







MMPA, ESA, NEPA 
Plaintiffs were entitled to a “carefully 
tailored” preliminary injunction because 
they were likely to succeed in showing 
that: (1) authorization of harassment of 
up to 12% of marine mammals violates 
the MMPA’s “small numbers” limitation; 
 
 
The Navy’s peacetime use of SURTASS 
LFAS for training, testing, and routine 
operations in the world’s oceans under 











279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D.  Cal. 2003) 
(2) NMFS impermissibly narrowed the 
definition of “harassment” under the 
MMPA; (3) NMFS violated NEPA by 
arbitrarily postponing the designation of 
additional “off limits” areas; (4) NMFS 
violated NEPA by not sufficiently 
analyzing alternatives; (5) NMFS violated 
the ESA by illegally defining “adverse 
modification”; and (6) NMFS violated the 
ESA by not including proper incidental 
take statements in its Biological Opinions.
 
Court entered permanent “carefully 
tailored” injunction and summary 
judgment for plaintiffs on 10 grounds, the 
above 6 plus: (7) NMFS improperly 
scoped final rule on permissible take 
under MMPA; (8) final rule failed to 
adequately mitigate adverse impacts; (9) 
defendants violated NEPA by failing to 
take “hard look” at impacts on fish; and 
(10) Navy failed use best available science 
when consulting under ESA. 
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush 
 








ESA, MMPA, NEPA 
Whale and dolphin plaintiffs were not 
“persons” under the Acts and therefore 
lacked standing to bring their claims. 
Moreover, the claims relating to the 
special system of deployment were not 
ripe, and President Bush was not 
amenable to suit. 
 
 
Navy’s deployment of SURTASS LFAS 
world-wide during times of heightened 
threat. 
386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) The Court of Appeals affirmed that the 
marine mammals lacked standing to bring 
their claims. 
Haw. County Green Party v. Evans 
No. C-03-0078 SC, 2003 WL 21033523 
(N.D. Cal. May 2, 2003) 
 
MMPA, ESA 
After permanently enjoining NMFS’s 
permits on January 24, on grounds that 
NMFS improperly relied on NEPA 
categorical exclusions, the district court 
granted NMFS’s motion for entry of 
judgment. 
 
Scientific experimentation in the 
northern Pacific Ocean to test whale-
finding high-frequency SONAR on gray 
whales. 
Australians for Animals v. Evans 
301 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
 
NEPA, MMPA 
NMFS did not violate either NEPA or the 
MMPA in issuing the scientific research 
permits. 
 
Scientific experimentation off the coast of 
California to test whale-finding high-
frequency SONAR on gray whales. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Marine Fisheries Serv. 
409 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 
 
Freedom of Information Act 
NMFS failed to disclose all relevant and 
unprivileged information relating to 
environmental impacts of MFAS. 
 
 
Proposed Navy MFAS training range off 
the coast of North Carolina. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter I 
 
Complaint, CV 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 
2005) 
 




NEPA, APA, ESA 
No decisions yet. 
 
 
All Navy uses of MFAS. 






[MMPA], NEPA, ESA, CZMA 
NRDC files TRO request. 
 
 
Navy’s use of MFAS during its Rim of the 
Pacific war games (RIMPAC). 
 
June 28, 2006 
 
June 30, 2006: Navy invoked MMPA’s 
national defense exemption. 
 
July 3, 2006 
 







March 22, 2007 
 
 
No. 8:07-cv-00335-FMC-FMOx, 2007 WL 















Plaintiffs file complaint. 
 
Exempted all relevant MFAS activities 




The parties negotiated a settlement 
requiring the Navy to use mitigation. The 
district court dismissed the case with 
prejudice but retained jurisdiction to 
oversee the Navy’s employment of the 
required mitigation. 
 
NEPA, ESA, CZMA 
Current complaint filed. 
 
District court issued a blanket preliminary 
injunction because it was likely that: (1) 
the Navy violated NEPA by failing to 
prepare an EIS; (2) the Navy violated 
NEPA by using inadequate mitigation; (3) 
the Navy violated NEPA by not 
considering adequate alternatives or 
cumulative impacts in its EA; (4) the Navy 
violated the CZMA by not adopting the 
mitigation measures that the California 
Coastal Commission deemed necessary to 
render the MFAS exercises consistent with 
California’s Coastal Zone Management 
Plan; and (5) irreparable harm would 
















Fourteen large-scale MFAS training 
exercises—both Composite Training Unit 
Exercises (COMPTUEX) and Joint Task 
Force Exercises (JTFEX)—collectively 
referred to as RIMPAC or the SOCAL 
exercises, occurring off the coast of 
southern California between February 
































527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
 
complied with the ESA in issuing its 
Biological Opinion and Incidental Take 
Statement. 
 
Navy is entitled to a stay of the injunction 
pending appeal because the district court 
did not consider the public interest in 
having a trained and effective Navy when 
it issued the injunction. 
 
Court of Appeals vacated its own stay of 
the injunction on a showing that a more 
narrowly tailored injunction was 
warranted and that the district court could 
effectively issue it. 
 
The district court issued a narrowly 
tailored injunction that required the Navy 
to use specific mitigation measures in its 
MFAS operations off the California coast. 
 
The Court of Appeals remanded so the 
district court could consider two January 
15, 2008, legal events: (1) President Bush 
exempted the Navy’s MFAS training in 
southern California from the CZMA’s 
consistency requirement; and (2) the CEQ 
found “emergency circumstances” existed 
and provided the Navy with “alternative 
arrangements” for complying with NEPA.
 
No “emergency circumstances” existed to 






























No. 07-1239, 2008 WL 859374 (Mar. 31, 
2008) 
 
128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008) 
under NEPA. As a result, despite the 
presidential exemption from the CZMA, 
no stay of the injunction was warranted, 
because the injunction rested firmly on 
NEPA grounds. 
 
Stay of injunction pending appeal was not 
necessary in light of Court of Appeals’ sua 
sponte order expediting appeal. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court in finding that the Navy’s need for 
long-planned training exercises without 
mitigation did not constitute “emergency 
circumstances” under NEPA, and that the 
plaintiffs had demonstrated probable 
success on the merits. The district court 
also had properly balanced the public 
interest factors, and hence the preliminary 
injunction was upheld. 
 
The Court of Appeals partially stayed two 
of the mitigation measures required in the 
preliminary injunction for 30 days, unless 
the Navy petitioned the Supreme Court 
for review, at which point the partial stay 
would remain in effect until final 
resolution by that Court. 
 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed. 
 
 



















October 8, 2008 
 
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
defined by petitioner Winter): (1) 
“Whether CEQ permissibly construed its 
own regulation in finding ‘emergency 
circumstances’”; and (2) “[w]hether, in 
any event, the preliminary injunction, 
based on a preliminary finding that the 
Navy had not satisfied NEPA’s procedural 
requirements, is inconsistent with 
established equitable principles limiting 




District court’s award of $437,584.24 in 
attorneys’ fees vacated for reconsideration 
because fee enhancement was not justified 




Supreme Court reverses lower courts, 
finding that the public interest in national 
security and the Navy’s need to train 
clearly outweigh the potential harm to 
marine mammals, vacating the challenged 
mitigation measures. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Navy 
Complaint, No. 2:2007cv01899, (C.D. Cal. 











Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gutierrez 
 
No. C-07-04771, 2008 WL 360852 (N.D. 








August 12, 2008 [See Carolyn Whetzel, 
Navy Department Agrees to Limit Use of Low-
Frequency Sonar in Pacific Ocean, [Aug.] 
Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 157, at A-5 
(Aug. 14, 2008)]. 
 
 
MMPA, NEPA, ESA 
The district court ordered the 
continuation of the carefully tailored 
injunction issued under the 2002 Final 
Rule, requiring additional mitigation 
measures, on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs had shown likely violations of all 
three statutes. 
 
The U.S. Navy settled this litigation. “Terms 
of the settlement mirror those” in the 
Northern District of California’s February 
2008 preliminary injunction. Like the 
injunction, the settlement allows the Navy 
to test its sonar in the western and eastern 
Pacific Ocean but limits those operations to 
defined areas not likely to harm marine 
mammals. Testing must be conducted 
more than fifty nautical miles away from 
the main islands and is prohibited in both 
the Hawaii Humpback Whale Marine 
Sanctuary and Papahanaumokuakea 
Marine National Monument. In addition, 
the Navy must reduce decibel levels when 
near coastlines in the western Pacific. 
 
 
Navy’s peacetime use of SURTASS LFAS 
throughout the world pursuant to the 
2007 Final Rule. 
Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates 
 






NEPA, CZMA, NMSA, [ESA] 
The district court issued a narrowly tailored 
preliminary injunction requiring additional
mitigation because plaintiffs were likely to 
 
Navy’s use of MFAS in 12 undersea 
 
 
warfare training exercises (USWEX) in 
the Hawaiian Islands Operating Area 


























2008 WL 2185180 (D. Haw. May 27, 2008) 
show that: (1) the Navy violated NEPA by 
failing to provide for public comment; (2) 
the Navy arbitrarily relied on NMFS’s 
scientifically unsupported noise thresholds 
in the EAs; (3) the Navy’s alternatives 
analysis violated NEPA; (4) the Navy acted 
arbitrarily in failing to prepare an EIS; (5) 
the Navy violated the CZMA by submitting 
its negative determinations after the 
statutory deadline; (6) the Navy arbitrarily 
relied on its flawed NEPA analysis in issuing 
its negative determinations under the 
CZMA; and (7) irreparable harm would 
occur. However, the court held that the 
plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in their 
NMSA claim because the Navy’s use of 
MFAS was fully disclosed and considered 
during the consultation process. 
 
 
The district court modified the original 
preliminary injunction in part in light of 
the Navy’s experiences with its March 2008 
USWEX. 
 
The district court partially granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion that NMFS and the Navy 
be compelled to complete their 
administrative records. 
 
